Security Advisories

If you think you have found a security bug in Botan please contact Jack Lloyd (jack@randombit.net). If you would like to encrypt your mail please use:

pub   rsa3072/57123B60 2015-03-23
      Key fingerprint = 4E60 C735 51AF 2188 DF0A  5A62 78E9 8043 5712 3B60
      uid         Jack Lloyd <jack@randombit.net>

This key can be found in the file doc/pgpkey.txt or online at https://keybase.io/jacklloyd and on most PGP keyservers.

2016

  • 2016-11-27 (CVE-2016-9132) Integer overflow in BER decoder

    While decoding BER length fields, an integer overflow could occur. This could occur while parsing untrusted inputs such as X.509 certificates. The overflow does not seem to lead to any obviously exploitable condition, but exploitation cannot be positively ruled out. Only 32-bit platforms are likely affected; to cause an overflow on 64-bit the parsed data would have to be many gigabytes. Bug found by Falko Strenzke, cryptosource GmbH.

    Fixed in 1.10.14 and 1.11.34, all prior versions affected.

  • 2016-10-26 (CVE-2016-8871) OAEP side channel

    A side channel in OAEP decoding could be used to distinguish RSA ciphertexts that did or did not have a leading 0 byte. For an attacker capable of precisely measuring the time taken for OAEP decoding, this could be used as an oracle allowing decryption of arbitrary RSA ciphertexts. Remote exploitation seems difficult as OAEP decoding is always paired with RSA decryption, which takes substantially more (and variable) time, and so will tend to mask the timing channel. This attack does seems well within reach of a local attacker capable of a cache or branch predictor based side channel attack. Finding, analysis, and patch by Juraj Somorovsky.

    Introduced in 1.11.29, fixed in 1.11.33

  • 2016-08-30 (CVE-2016-6878) Undefined behavior in Curve25519

    On systems without a native 128-bit integer type, the Curve25519 code invoked undefined behavior. This was known to produce incorrect results on 32-bit ARM when compiled by Clang.

    Introduced in 1.11.12, fixed in 1.11.31

  • 2016-08-30 (CVE-2016-6879) Bad result from X509_Certificate::allowed_usage

    If allowed_usage was called with more than one Key_Usage set in the enum value, the function would return true if any of the allowed usages were set, instead of if all of the allowed usages are set. This could be used to bypass an application key usage check. Credit to Daniel Neus of Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity for finding this issue.

    Introduced in 1.11.0, fixed in 1.11.31

  • 2016-03-17 (CVE-2016-2849): ECDSA side channel

    ECDSA (and DSA) signature algorithms perform a modular inverse on the signature nonce k. The modular inverse algorithm used had input dependent loops, and it is possible a side channel attack could recover sufficient information about the nonce to eventually recover the ECDSA secret key. Found by Sean Devlin.

    Introduced in 1.7.15, fixed in 1.10.13 and 1.11.29

  • 2016-03-17 (CVE-2016-2850): Failure to enforce TLS policy

    TLS v1.2 allows negotiating which signature algorithms and hash functions each side is willing to accept. However received signatures were not actually checked against the specified policy. This had the effect of allowing a server to use an MD5 or SHA-1 signature, even though the default policy prohibits it. The same issue affected client cert authentication.

    The TLS client also failed to verify that the ECC curve the server chose to use was one which was acceptable by the client policy.

    Introduced in 1.11.0, fixed in 1.11.29

  • 2016-02-01 (CVE-2016-2196): Overwrite in P-521 reduction

    The P-521 reduction function would overwrite zero to one word following the allocated block. This could potentially result in remote code execution or a crash. Found with AFL

    Introduced in 1.11.10, fixed in 1.11.27

  • 2016-02-01 (CVE-2016-2195): Heap overflow on invalid ECC point

    The PointGFp constructor did not check that the affine coordinate arguments were less than the prime, but then in curve multiplication assumed that both arguments if multiplied would fit into an integer twice the size of the prime.

    The bigint_mul and bigint_sqr functions received the size of the output buffer, but only used it to dispatch to a faster algorithm in cases where there was sufficient output space to call an unrolled multiplication function.

    The result is a heap overflow accessible via ECC point decoding, which accepted untrusted inputs. This is likely exploitable for remote code execution.

    On systems which use the mlock pool allocator, it would allow an attacker to overwrite memory held in secure_vector objects. After this point the write will hit the guard page at the end of the mmap’ed region so it probably could not be used for code execution directly, but would allow overwriting adjacent key material.

    Found by Alex Gaynor fuzzing with AFL

    Introduced in 1.9.18, fixed in 1.11.27 and 1.10.11

  • 2016-02-01 (CVE-2016-2194): Infinite loop in modular square root algorithm

    The ressol function implements the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm for finding square roots could be sent into a nearly infinite loop due to a misplaced conditional check. This could occur if a composite modulus is provided, as this algorithm is only defined for primes. This function is exposed to attacker controlled input via the OS2ECP function during ECC point decompression. Found by AFL

    Introduced in 1.7.15, fixed in 1.11.27 and 1.10.11

2015

  • 2015-11-04: TLS certificate authentication bypass

    When the bugs affecting X.509 path validation were fixed in 1.11.22, a check in Credentials_Manager::verify_certificate_chain was accidentally removed which caused path validation failures not to be signaled to the TLS layer. So for affected versions, certificate authentication in TLS is bypassed. As a workaround, applications can override the call and implement the correct check. Reported by Florent Le Coz in GH #324

    Introduced in 1.11.22, fixed in 1.11.24

  • 2015-10-26 (CVE-2015-7824): Padding oracle attack on TLS

    A padding oracle attack was possible against TLS CBC ciphersuites because if a certain length check on the packet fields failed, a different alert type than one used for message authentication failure would be returned to the sender. This check triggering would leak information about the value of the padding bytes and could be used to perform iterative decryption.

    As with most such oracle attacks, the danger depends on the underlying protocol - HTTP servers are particularly vulnerable. The current analysis suggests that to exploit it an attacker would first have to guess several bytes of plaintext, but again this is quite possible in many situations including HTTP.

    Found in a review by Sirrix AG and 3curity GmbH.

    Introduced in 1.11.0, fixed in 1.11.22

  • 2015-10-26 (CVE-2015-7825): Infinite loop during certificate path validation

    When evaluating a certificate path, if a loop in the certificate chain was encountered (for instance where C1 certifies C2, which certifies C1) an infinite loop would occur eventually resulting in memory exhaustion. Found in a review by Sirrix AG and 3curity GmbH.

    Introduced in 1.11.6, fixed in 1.11.22

  • 2015-10-26 (CVE-2015-7826): Acceptance of invalid certificate names

    RFC 6125 specifies how to match a X.509v3 certificate against a DNS name for application usage.

    Otherwise valid certificates using wildcards would be accepted as matching certain hostnames that should they should not according to RFC 6125. For example a certificate issued for *.example.com should match foo.example.com but not example.com or bar.foo.example.com. Previously Botan would accept such a certificate as also valid for bar.foo.example.com.

    RFC 6125 also requires that when matching a X.509 certificate against a DNS name, the CN entry is only compared if no subjectAlternativeName entry is available. Previously X509_Certificate::matches_dns_name would always check both names.

    Found in a review by Sirrix AG and 3curity GmbH.

    Introduced in 1.11.0, fixed in 1.11.22

  • 2015-10-26 (CVE-2015-7827): PKCS #1 v1.5 decoding was not constant time

    During RSA decryption, how long decoding of PKCS #1 v1.5 padding took was input dependent. If these differences could be measured by an attacker, it could be used to mount a Bleichenbacher million-message attack. PKCS #1 v1.5 decoding has been rewritten to use a sequence of operations which do not contain any input-dependent indexes or jumps. Notations for checking constant time blocks with ctgrind (https://github.com/agl/ctgrind) were added to PKCS #1 decoding among other areas. Found in a review by Sirrix AG and 3curity GmbH.

    Fixed in 1.11.22 and 1.10.13. Affected all previous versions.

  • 2015-08-03 (CVE-2015-5726): Crash in BER decoder

    The BER decoder would crash due to reading from offset 0 of an empty vector if it encountered a BIT STRING which did not contain any data at all. This can be used to easily crash applications reading untrusted ASN.1 data, but does not seem exploitable for code execution. Found with afl.

    Fixed in 1.11.19 and 1.10.10, affected all previous versions of 1.10 and 1.11

  • 2015-08-03 (CVE-2015-5727): Excess memory allocation in BER decoder

    The BER decoder would allocate a fairly arbitrary amount of memory in a length field, even if there was no chance the read request would succeed. This might cause the process to run out of memory or invoke the OOM killer. Found with afl.

    Fixed in 1.11.19 and 1.10.10, affected all previous versions of 1.10 and 1.11

2014

  • 2014-04-10 (CVE-2014-9742): Insufficient randomness in Miller-Rabin primality check

    A bug in the Miller-Rabin primality test resulted in only a single random base being used instead of a sequence of such bases. This increased the probability that a non-prime would be accepted by is_prime or that a randomly generated prime might actually be composite. The probability of a random 1024 bit number being incorrectly classed as prime with a single base is around 2^-40. Reported by Jeff Marrison.

    Introduced in 1.8.3, fixed in 1.10.8 and 1.11.9